+# host IN A 12.12.12.12
+# host IN AAAA 1234::5678
+# host IN CNAME foo.bar. <- Trailing dot is required
+# host IN MX foo.bar. <- Trailing dot is required
+def DoDNS(Str, Attrs, DnRecord):
+ cnamerecord = re.match(r"^[-\w]+\s+IN\s+CNAME\s+([-\w.]+\.)$", Str, re.IGNORECASE)
+ arecord = re.match(r'^[-\w]+\s+IN\s+A\s+(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$', Str, re.IGNORECASE)
+ mxrecord = re.match(r"^[-\w]+\s+IN\s+MX\s+(\d{1,3})\s+([-\w.]+\.)$", Str, re.IGNORECASE)
+ txtrecord = re.match(r"^[-\w]+\s+IN\s+TXT\s+([-\d. a-z\t<>@:]+)", Str, re.IGNORECASE)
+ aaaarecord = re.match(r'^[-\w]+\s+IN\s+AAAA\s+([A-F0-9:]{2,39})$', Str, re.IGNORECASE)
+
+ if cnamerecord is None and\
+ arecord is None and\
+ mxrecord is None and\
+ txtrecord is None and\
+ aaaarecord is None:
+ return None
+
+ # Check if the name is already taken
+ G = re.match(r'^([-\w+]+)\s', Str)
+ if G is None:
+ raise UDFormatError("Hostname not found although we already passed record syntax checks")
+ hostname = G.group(1)
+
+ # Check for collisions
+ global lc
+ # [JT 20070409 - search for both tab and space suffixed hostnames
+ # since we accept either. It'd probably be better to parse the
+ # incoming string in order to construct what we feed LDAP rather
+ # than just passing it through as is.]
+ filter = "(|(dnsZoneEntry=%s *)(dnsZoneEntry=%s *))" % (hostname, hostname)
+ Rec = lc.search_s(BaseDn, ldap.SCOPE_ONELEVEL, filter, ["uid"])
+ for x in Rec:
+ if GetAttr(x, "uid") != GetAttr(DnRecord, "uid"):
+ return "DNS entry is already owned by " + GetAttr(x, "uid")
+
+ global SeenDNS
+ global DNS
+
+ if cnamerecord:
+ if hostname in DNS:
+ return "CNAME and other RR types not allowed: " + Str
+ else:
+ DNS[hostname] = 2
+ else:
+ if DNS.get(hostname) == 2:
+ return "CNAME and other RR types not allowed: " + Str
+ else:
+ DNS[hostname] = 1
+
+ if cnamerecord is not None:
+ sanitized = "%s IN CNAME %s" % (hostname, cnamerecord.group(1))
+ elif txtrecord is not None:
+ sanitized = "%s IN TXT %s" % (hostname, txtrecord.group(1))
+ elif arecord is not None:
+ ipaddress = arecord.group(1)
+ for quad in ipaddress.split('.'):
+ if not (int(quad) >= 0 and int(quad) <= 255):
+ return "Invalid quad %s in IP address %s in line %s" % (quad, ipaddress, Str)
+ sanitized = "%s IN A %s" % (hostname, ipaddress)
+ elif mxrecord is not None:
+ priority = mxrecord.group(1)
+ mx = mxrecord.group(2)
+ sanitized = "%s IN MX %s %s" % (hostname, priority, mx)
+ elif aaaarecord is not None:
+ ipv6address = aaaarecord.group(1)
+ parts = ipv6address.split(':')
+ if len(parts) > 8:
+ return "Invalid IPv6 address (%s): too many parts" % (ipv6address)
+ if len(parts) <= 2:
+ return "Invalid IPv6 address (%s): too few parts" % (ipv6address)
+ if parts[0] == "":
+ parts.pop(0)
+ if parts[-1] == "":
+ parts.pop(-1)
+ seenEmptypart = False
+ for p in parts:
+ if len(p) > 4:
+ return "Invalid IPv6 address (%s): part %s is longer than 4 characters" % (ipv6address, p)
+ if p == "":
+ if seenEmptypart:
+ return "Invalid IPv6 address (%s): more than one :: (nothing in between colons) is not allowed" % (ipv6address)
+ seenEmptypart = True
+ sanitized = "%s IN AAAA %s" % (hostname, ipv6address)
+ else:
+ raise UDFormatError("None of the types I recognize was it. I shouldn't be here. confused.")
+
+ if SeenDNS:
+ Attrs.append((ldap.MOD_ADD, "dnsZoneEntry", sanitized))
+ return "DNS Entry added " + sanitized
+
+ Attrs.append((ldap.MOD_REPLACE, "dnsZoneEntry", sanitized))
+ SeenDNS = 1
+ return "DNS Entry replaced with " + sanitized
+
+
+# Handle an RBL list (mailRBL, mailRHSBL, mailWhitelist)
+def DoRBL(Str, Attrs):
+ Match = re.compile('^mail(rbl|rhsbl|whitelist) ([-a-z0-9.]+)$').match(Str.lower())
+ if Match is None:
+ return None
+
+ if Match.group(1) == "rbl":
+ Key = "mailRBL"
+ if Match.group(1) == "rhsbl":
+ Key = "mailRHSBL"
+ if Match.group(1) == "whitelist":
+ Key = "mailWhitelist"
+ Host = Match.group(2)
+
+ global SeenList
+ if Key in SeenList:
+ Attrs.append((ldap.MOD_ADD, Key, Host))
+ return "%s added %s" % (Key, Host)
+
+ Attrs.append((ldap.MOD_REPLACE, Key, Host))
+ SeenList[Key] = 1
+ return "%s replaced with %s" % (Key, Host)
+
+
+# Handle a ConfirmSudoPassword request
+def DoConfirmSudopassword(Str, SudoPasswd):
+ Match = re.compile('^confirm sudopassword (' + UUID_FORMAT + ') ([a-z0-9.,*-]+) ([0-9a-f]{40})$').match(Str)
+ if Match is None:
+ return None
+
+ uuid = Match.group(1)
+ hosts = Match.group(2)
+ hmac = Match.group(3)
+
+ SudoPasswd[uuid] = (hosts, hmac)
+ return "got confirm for sudo password %s on host(s) %s, auth code %s" % (uuid, hosts, hmac)
+
+
+def FinishConfirmSudopassword(lc, uid, Attrs, SudoPasswd):
+ result = "\n"
+
+ if len(SudoPasswd) == 0:
+ return None
+
+ res = lc.search_s(BaseDn, ldap.SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "uid=" + uid, ['sudoPassword'])
+ if len(res) != 1:
+ raise UDFormatError("Not exactly one hit when searching for user")
+ if 'sudoPassword' in res[0][1]:
+ inldap = res[0][1]['sudoPassword']
+ else:
+ inldap = []
+
+ newldap = []
+ for entry in inldap:
+ Match = re.compile('^(' + UUID_FORMAT + ') (confirmed:[0-9a-f]{40}|unconfirmed) ([a-z0-9.,*-]+) ([^ ]+)$').match(entry)
+ if Match is None:
+ raise UDFormatError("Could not parse existing sudopasswd entry")
+ uuid = Match.group(1)
+ status = Match.group(2)
+ hosts = Match.group(3)
+ cryptedpass = Match.group(4)
+
+ if uuid in SudoPasswd:
+ confirmedHosts = SudoPasswd[uuid][0]
+ confirmedHmac = SudoPasswd[uuid][1]
+ if status.startswith('confirmed:'):
+ if status == 'confirmed:' + make_passwd_hmac('password-is-confirmed', 'sudo', uid, uuid, hosts, cryptedpass):
+ result += "Entry %s for sudo password on hosts %s already confirmed.\n" % (uuid, hosts)
+ else:
+ result += "Entry %s for sudo password on hosts %s is listed as confirmed, but HMAC does not verify.\n" % (uuid, hosts)
+ elif confirmedHosts != hosts:
+ result += "Entry %s hostlist mismatch (%s vs. %s).\n" % (uuid, hosts, confirmedHosts)
+ elif make_passwd_hmac('confirm-new-password', 'sudo', uid, uuid, hosts, cryptedpass) == confirmedHmac:
+ result += "Entry %s for sudo password on hosts %s now confirmed.\n" % (uuid, hosts)
+ status = 'confirmed:' + make_passwd_hmac('password-is-confirmed', 'sudo', uid, uuid, hosts, cryptedpass)
+ else:
+ result += "Entry %s for sudo password on hosts %s HMAC verify failed.\n" % (uuid, hosts)
+ del SudoPasswd[uuid]
+
+ newentry = " ".join([uuid, status, hosts, cryptedpass])
+ if len(newldap) == 0:
+ newldap.append((ldap.MOD_REPLACE, "sudoPassword", newentry))
+ else:
+ newldap.append((ldap.MOD_ADD, "sudoPassword", newentry))
+
+ for entry in SudoPasswd:
+ result += "Entry %s that you confirm is not listed in ldap." % (entry,)
+
+ for entry in newldap:
+ Attrs.append(entry)
+
+ return result
+
+
+def connect_to_ldap_and_check_if_locked(DnRecord):
+ # Connect to the ldap server
+ lc = connectLDAP()
+ F = open(PassDir + "/pass-" + pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid())[0], "r")
+ AccessPass = F.readline().strip().split(" ")
+ F.close()
+ lc.simple_bind_s("uid={},{}".format(AccessPass[0], BaseDn), AccessPass[1])
+
+ # Check for a locked account
+ Attrs = lc.search_s(BaseDn, ldap.SCOPE_ONELEVEL, "uid=" + GetAttr(DnRecord, "uid"))
+ if (GetAttr(Attrs[0], "userPassword").find("*LK*") != -1) \
+ or GetAttr(Attrs[0], "userPassword").startswith("!"):
+ raise UDNotAllowedError("This account is locked")
+ return lc
+